PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE

THE LORD PRESIDENT of the Federal Court of Malaysia, the Honourable Tun Azmi bin Haji Mohamed, in opening the third Magristrates' Conference at Petaling Jaya on October 4, 1971 suggested that judicial officers in Malaysia should adopt certain principles of justice to be known as "Rukun Keadilan", viz:

1. A Judge must be independent

2. A Judge must have no interest in any matter he has to try

3. Justice must be seen to be done

4. A Judge must act on evidence

5. A Judge must give reasons for his decision

6. A Judge must conduct himself well whether in the course of his
judicial duties or in his private life

In his speech, the Lord President said: "We have the Rukunnegara, a set of principles set down by the authority of all of us to remember and to practice. So why not we have our Rukun Keadilan -- a set of first principles which we Judicial Officers must always remember and practice in carrying out our work of administering justice. They are specially for those of us who sit on the Bench and sometimes in chambers, to hear cases.

First, I think it is important that a judge must be independent. That means he must not allow the fear of retaliation, particularly from the political authority administering the Government. You know that to ensure this so far as judges of the High Court and the Federal Court are concerned, our Constitution has given certain protection. There is no such provision for you magistrates, but notwithstanding that I think it is always important to remember that whatever might happen to you, not that I think it would, you must not allow fear of retaliation from any higher authority to affect your decision.

The second principle should be this: A judge must have no interest in any matter he has to try. Of course, you should try a case whether it be criminal or civil, if one of the parties is your personal friend. I am not referring to the case of a deputy public prosecutor or a police officer appearing for the prosecution. But I would suggest that you should not try a criminal case where the accused is a close friend of yours or a relation, and in extreme cases where your wife is a witness, unless she is merely giving formal evidence. It is because of this principle that we regard corruption as a serious matter, because God forbid, if a magistrate receives a bribe from a party, then I suggest he has interest in the result of the case.

The third principle is that justice must be seen to be done. A famous example of this is seen in Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Co. Lord Cottenham, while he was the Lord Chancellor, he heard an appeal from a judgement of the lower court. He agreed with the original court and dismissed the appeal of Mr Dimes. It was found later that Lord Cottenham had a number of shares in the company. The House of Lords was compelled to set aside the judgement of Lord Cottenham. Lord Campbell,
one of the judges of the House of Lords had this to say:

"No one can support that Lord Cottenham could be, in the remotest degree, influenced by the interest that he had in this concern; but, My Lords, it is of the last importance that the maxim that no man is to be a judge in his own cause should be held sacred. And that is not to be confined to a cause in which he is a party, but applies to a cause in which he has an interest. Since I have had the honour to be Chief Justice of the Court of the Queen's Bench, we have again and again set aside proceedings in inferior tribunals because an individual, who had an interest in a cause, took part in the decision. And it will have a most salutary influence on these tribunals when it is known that this High Court of last resort, in a case in which the Lord Chancellor of
England had an interest, considered that his decree was on that account not according to law, and was set aside. This will be a lesson to all inferior tribunals to take care not only that in their decrees they are not influenced by personal interest, but to avoid the appearance of labouring under such an influence."

The next principle is: A judge must act on evidence. In this connextion it is only necessary to remind you that you must always give every opportunity for the accused or the defendant to bring all evidence that he thinks should be given, so that is is not a bad idea to adjourn a case if the accused or the defendant tell you that he wishes to call another witness. This would be especially necessary if such an accused person is not represented by counsel. You must make an accused or defendant feel that the judge or magistrate as the case may be is being fair to him. When I say that you must act on evidence, I mean evidence
which is given at the trial, where both parties are present in person or by counsel. It is therefore important to remember that you mut not make use of anything, though relevant, which comes to you otherwise than at the trial. If therefore you should come to hear something of a case pending before you that you think is important and would affect your decision, I suggest that you should not proceed with the case yourself.

The next principle is that a judge or magistrate must give reasons for his decision. I am not saying that a judgement is wrong because a judge does not give his reasons or that he gave the wrong reasons. We know from experience that we dismiss appeals for instance, against a judgement of the lower court though we did not agree with the reasons given or that he gave the wrong reasons but found other reasons for upholding his judgement. But it should always be the practice of the trial judges or magistrates to give reasons so that the parties would feel satisfied that the case has been dealth with fairly and according
to principles of justice.

There should, I think, be another principle and this definitely is the last one. A judge or magistrate must conduct himself well whether in the course of his judicial duties or in his private life. His conduct must be above reproach. That means while on the Bench you must act with dignity, because dignity commands respect -- dignity of language and behaviour. By dignity I do not mean pompousness. Do not, for instance, be too quick to notice an act of discourtesy where it is unintentional. Though you have in certain cases to give adverse comments against a witness in a trial, it is, I suggest, surely within the power of your expression to do so with dignified words. It is not necessary, for instance, to call a witness a liar where it would serve
the purpose to say he is not telling the whole truth. Always remember that the person in a witness box is a nervour man. you must also see that counsel does not bully any witness. Dignity begets dignity. If a magistrate always acts with dignity, everybody else concerned in a trial would act similarly."